Master in Economic Analysis (Plan: 405 - Estudio: 68)
EPC
Coordinating teacher: SCHNEIDER , JOHANNES SIEGFRIED
Department assigned to the subject: Economics Department
Type: Electives
ECTS Credits: 4.0 ECTS
Course: 2º
Semester: 2º
Requirements (Subjects that are assumed to be known)
Microeconomics I, II, and III
Macroeconomics I, II, and III
Econometrics I, II, and III
from the MAEs core sequence
Objectives
This course is designed to bring students to the research frontier in contract theory. Students that plan to do research in all areas that involve an understanding of contracts and negotiations are provided with tools and concepts to model and analyze existing contracts, the design of contracts and their dynamic consequences. Beyond studying tools, we put contract theory to work: we look at applications on the research frontier and the lessons contract theory teaches us about them.
After successful completion, students should have the tools and background to do research on contract theory and/or apply state of the art concepts to their applications of interest.
Part A: Techniques.
1. Introduction to Dynamic Optimization, Optimal Control, Dynamic Games
2. A refresher on Moral Hazard
3. Experimentation Models
Part B: Applications
1. Innovation
2. Collaboration
3. Industrial Organization
4. Organizational Economics
5. Political Economy
6. Behavioural Economics
7. Theoretical Advances
Learning activities and methodology
Lectures
Student Presentations
Written Reports and Research Proposals
Class Discussion
Teamwork
Office hours
The focus of the lectures is the introduction of lectures is to introduce and repeat techniques and concepts. Students are then preparing individually or in teams presentations of recent applications of those tools on the basis of current working papers or recent publications. We discuss the papers, their modeling choices and alternatives in class. Students are then asked to use the insights gained to either provide a report on an existing paper or present a related research idea of their own.
Assessment System
% end-of-term-examination 40
% of continuous assessment (assigments, laboratory, practicals...) 60
Acemoglu, Daron. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press. 2008
Acemoglu, Daron and Matt Jackson. History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms. Review of Economic Studies. 2015
BArron, Daniel, Yingni Guo and Bryony Reich. Wealth Dynamics in Communities. Review of Economic Studies . 2023
Bard Harstad. Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: From Kyoto to Paris. The Economic Journal . 2022
Bard Harstad and MArco Battaglini. The Political Economy of Weakt Treaties. Journal of Political Economy. 2020
Bergemann, Dirk and Ulrich Hege. The financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping. RAND Journal of Economics. 2005
Boleslavsky Ralph and Curt Taylor. Make it 'til you fake it. Journal of Economic Theory. 2024
Bolton, Patrick and Christopher Harris. Strategic Experimentation. Econometrica. 1999
Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory. MIT Press. 2004
Botond Koszegi. Behavioral Contract Theory. Journal of Economic Literature. 2014
Bruno Strulovici. Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation. Econometrica . 2010
Bruno Strulovici. Renegotiation Proof Contracts with Persistent states. mimeo. 2022
Cetemen Doruk; Can Urgun and Leeat Yariv. Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves. Journal of Political Economy. 2023
Dai Tianjiao and Juusoo Toikka. Robust inventives for Teams. Econometrica . 2022
Deb, Joyee; Aditya Kuvalekar and Elliot Lipnowski. Fostering Collaboration. mimeo. 2023
Deb, Rahul; Mattew Mitchell and Mallesh Pai. Bad Reputation in Relational Contracting. 2022. Theoretical Economics
Ederer, Florian and Gustavo Manso. Is pay for perfromance detrimental to innovation. Management Science. 2013
Ely, Jeff; George Georgiadis and Luis Rayo. Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard. mimeo. 2023
Foarta Dana and Takuo Sugaya. The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives. Rand Journal of Economics. 2021
Gabriel Carroll. Robustness in mechanism design and contracting. Annual Review of Economics. 2019
Georgiadis, George and Michael Powell. A/B Contracts. American Economic Review. 2022
Georgiadis, George, Doron Ravid and Balazs Szentes. Flexible Moral Hazard Problems. Econometrica. 2024
Gottlieb Daniel and Humberto Moreira. Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Theoretical Economics. 2022
Gustavo Manso. Motivating Innovation. The journal of FInance. 2011
Halac, MArina and Pierre Yared. Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy. American Economic Review. 2018
Halac, Marina, Ellito Lipnoswki and Daniel Rappoport. Rank uncertainty in Organizations. American Economic Review. 2021
Harry Pei. Reputation building under observational learning. Review of Economic Studies. 2023
Heidhues, Paul and Botond Koszegi. Behaviorual Industrial Organization. Handbook of Behavioral Economics --- Foundations and Applications 1. 2015
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Francesco Squintani. On the Direction of Innovation. Journal of Political Economy. 2021
Keller, Godfrey; Sven Rady and Martin Cripps. Strategic Experimentation and Exponential Bandits. Econometrica. 2005
Mailath, George and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press. 2006
Roger Myerson. Moral Hazard in Hoh Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy. Econometrica. 2015
Seierstad, Atle and Knut Sydsaeter. Optimal Control Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier North-Holland. 1986
Simon Board. Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty. American Economic Review. 2011
Sofia Moroni. Experimentation in Organizations. Theoretical Economics. 2022
Steven Callander. Searching and Learning by Trial and Error. American Economic Review. 2011
Strulovici Bruno and Martin Szydlowski. On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models. Journal of Economic Theory. 2015
Detailed subject contents or complementary information about assessment system of B.T.