A paper marked with [*] from the following list is going to be (partially) covered in class.
1. Committee Capture
[*]Neeman, Zvika. "The freedom to contract and the free-rider problem." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15.3 (1999): 685-703.
[*]Genicot, Garance, and Debraj Ray. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart." Journal of Economic Theory 131.1 (2006): 71-100.
[*]Dal Bo, Ernesto. "Bribing voters." American Journal of Political Science 51(4) (2007): 789-803.
[*]Louis-Sidois, Charles, and Leon Musolff. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences." Theoretical Economics forthcoming.
Winter, Eyal. "Incentives and discrimination." American Economic Review 94.3 (2004): 764-773.
Dekel, Eddie, Matthew O. Jackson, and Asher Wolinsky. "Vote buying: General elections." Journal of Political Economy 116.2 (2008): 351-380.
Name-Correa, Alvaro and Huseyin Yildirim. "A capture theory of committees." Public Choice 177.1 (2018): 135-154
Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder. "Buying supermajorities." American Political Science Review 90(2) (1996): 303-315.
Morgan, John, and Felix Várdy. "On the buyability of voting bodies." Journal of Theoretical Politics 23, no. 2 (2011): 260-287.
Chen, Ying, and Jan Zápal. "Sequential vote buying." Journal of Economic Theory 205 (2022): 105529.
2. Persuasion through Provision of Information
[*]Caillaud, Bernard, and Jean Tirole. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group." The American Economic Review 97.5 (2007): 1877-1900.
[*]Alonso, Ricardo and Odilon Câmara. 2016. "Persuading Voters." The American Economic Review, 106(11): 3590-3605.
[*]Chan, J., Gupta, S., Li, F. and Wang, Y., 2019. Pivotal persuasion. Journal of Economic theory, 180, pp.178-202.
[*]Malenko, Andrey, and Nadya Malenko. "Proxy advisory firms: The economics of selling information to voters." The Journal of Finance 74, no. 5 (2019): 2441-2490.
Bardhi, Arjada, and Yingni Guo. "Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent." Theoretical Economics 13, no. 3 (2018): 1111-1149.
Schnakenberg, Keith E. "Informational lobbying and legislative voting." American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 1 (2017): 129-145.
Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. "Lobbying legislatures." Journal of Political Economy 110.4 (2002): 919-946.
Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. "Informational lobbying and political contributions." Journal of Public Economics 90.4 (2006): 631-656.
Dellis, Arnaud. "Legislative informational lobbying." Journal of Economic Theory 208 (2023): 105595.
3. Committees with Mixed Motives
[*]Name-Correa, Alvaro J., and Huseyin Yildirim. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees." Journal of Economic Theory 184 (2019): 104943.
Midjord, Rune, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, and Justin Valasek. "Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A `state of the art model." Games and Economic Behavior 104 (2017): 430-443.
Morgan, John, and Felix Várdy. "Mixed motives and the optimal size of voting bodies." Journal of Political Economy 120.5 (2012): 986-1026.
Midjord, Rune, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, and Justin Valasek. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives." Journal of Economic Theory 198 (2021): 105354.
Malenko, N., 2014. Communication and decision-making in corporate boards. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(5), pp.1486-1532.
Callander, Steven. "Majority rule when voters like to win." Games and Economic behavior 64.2 (2008): 393-420.
Henry, Emeric, and Charles Louis-Sidois. 2020. "Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12 (3): 246-76.
4. Reputation, Biased Experts
Visser, Bauke, and Otto H. Swank. "On committees of experts." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122.1 (2007): 337-372.
Swank, Otto H., and Bauke Visser. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition." Journal of Public Economics 221 (2023): 104875.
Levy, Gilat. "Decision making in committees: Transparency, reputation, and voting rules." American economic review 97.1 (2007): 150-168.
Ottaviani, Marco, and Peter Sørensen. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?." Journal of Public Economics 81, no. 3 (2001): 393-421.
Correa, Alvaro J. Name, and Huseyin Yildirim. "Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee." Games and Economic Behavior 127 (2021): 1-27.
Hahn, Volker. "Committee design with endogenous participation." Games and Economic Behavior 102 (2017): 388-408.
Syllabus Second Module
Bowen, Renee, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas Lambert (2019): Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, pp. 243-298.
*Cvitani¿, Jak¿a, and George Georgiadis (2016): Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 8, pp. 309-342.
Coase, Ronald (1960): The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, pp. 1-44.
*Georgiadis, George (2017): Deadlines and Infrequent Monitoring in the Dynamic Provision of Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 152, pp. 1--12.
Georgiadis, George, and Michael Powell (2019): Lecture Notes on the Dynamic Provision of Public Goods.
Hardin, Garrett (1968): The Tragedy of The Commons. Science, vol. 162, pp. 1243-1248.
Hotelling, Harold (1931): The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 39, pp. 137-175.
IPCC (1992): Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments. In: IPCC First Assessment Report Overview and Policymaker Summaries and 1992 IPCC Supplement.
IPCC (2023): Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
Marx Leslie, and Steven A. Matthews (2000): Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 67, 327-358.
Nordhaus, William (1992): An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases. Science, vol. 258, pp. 1315-1319.
Ostrom, Elinor (1999): Coping with Tragedies of the Commons. Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2, pp. 493-535.
Tirole, Jean (2012): Some Political Economy of Global Warming. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, vol. 1, pp. 121-132.
Barrett, Scott (1994): Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 46, pp. 878-894.
Barrett, Scott (2006): Climate treaties and "breakthrough" technologies. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 96, pp. 22-25.
*Barrett, Scott (2013): Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 66, pp. 235-250.
Denter, Philipp (2023): Motivated Reasoning and the Political Economy of Ignoring Climate Change.
Gollier, Christian (2022): The cost-efficiency carbon pricing puzzle. Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 18-952.
Goulder, Lawrence, and Andrew Schein (2013): Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review. Climate Change Economics, vol. 4, pp. 1-28
Grüll, Georg, and Luca Taschini (2011): Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 61, pp. 107-118.
Harstad, Bård (2012): Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, pp. 1527-1557.
Harstad, Bård (2012): Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 120, pp.
*Harstad, Bård (2016): The Dynamics of Climate Agreements. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 14, pp. 719-52.
*Harstad, Bård (2022): Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris. The Economic Journal, vol. 133, pp. 1181-1216.
*Harstad, Bård, and Marco Battaglini (2020): The Political Economy of Weak Treaties. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 128, pp. 544--90.
Levy, Raphaël (2014): Soothing politics. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 120, pp. 126-133.
*MacKenzie, Ian A., and Markus Ohndorf (2012): Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 63, pp. 51-65.
Montero, Juan-Pablo (2005): Pollution Markets with Imperfectly Observed Emissions. The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 36, pp. 645-660.
Nordhaus, William (2015): Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, vol. 105, pp. 1339-1370.
Sinn, Hans-Werner (2008): Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach. International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 15, pp. 360--394.
Wagner, Ulrich (2001): The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy. Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15, pp. 377-411.
*Wagner, Ulrich (2016): Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 83, pp. 1741-1778.
Weitzman, Martin (1974): Prices vs. Quantities. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 41, pp. 477-491.
Yates, Andres, and Mark Cronshaw (2001): Pollution Permit Markets with Intertemporal Trading and Asymmetric Information. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol 42, pp. 104-118.
Lobbyisim & Activism
Baron, David (2001): Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 10, pp. 7-45.
*Baron, David (2016): Self-Regulation and the Market for Activism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 25, pp. 584--607.
*Baron, David, and Daniel Diermeier (2007): Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 16, pp. 599-634.
*Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille, and Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (2023): Radical activism and self-regulation: An optimal campaign mechanism. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 118, article 102789.
Egorov, Georgy, and Bård Harstad (2017): Private Politics and Public Regulation. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 84, pp. 1652--1682.
Hungerman, Daniel, and Vivek Moorthy (2023): Every Day Is Earth Day: Evidence on the Long-Term Impact of Environmental Activism. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol. 15, pp. 230-258.
Learning and disinformation
Acemoglu, Daron, Munther Dahleh, Ilan Lobel, and Asuman Ozdaglar (2011): Bayesian Learning in Social Networks. The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78, pp. 1201-1236.
*Acemoglu, Daron, Asuman Ozdaglar, and James Siderius (2022): A Model of Online Misinformation.
*Acemoglu, Daron, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Ali ParandehGheibi (2010): Spread of (mis)information in social networks. Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 70, pp. 194--227.
Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow (2017): Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 31, pp. 211--236.
Aral, Sinan, and Paramveer S. Dhillon (2018): Social influence maximization under empirical influence models. Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2, pp. 375-382.
*Barrera, Oscar, Sergei Guriev, Emeric Henry, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2020): Facts, alternative facts, and fact checking in times of post-truth politics. Journal of Public Economics, 182:104123.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch (1992): A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, pp. 992-1026.
Bowen, Renee, Danil Dmitriev, and Simone Galperti (2023): Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 138, pp. 955-1000.
Centola, Damon (2010): The spread of behavior in an online social network experiment. Science, vol. 329, pp. 1194-1197.
Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel (1982): Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 1431-1451.
DeGroot, Morris (1974): Reaching a Consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 69, pp. 118-121.
DeMarzo, Peter, Dimitri Vayanos, and Jeffrey Zwiebel (2003): Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, pp. 909--996.
Denter, Philipp, and Boris Ginzburg (2023): Troll Farms and Voter Disinformation.
*Denter, Philipp, Martin Dumav, and Boris Ginzburg (2021): Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect. The Economic Journal, Volume 131, pages 2033-2057.
Editorial (2017): Fake news threatens a climate literate world. Nature Communications, vol. 8, 15460.
*Golub, Benjamin, and Matthew O. Jackson (2010): Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 2, pp. 112-149.
*Guriev, Sergei, Emeric Henry, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2022): Checking and Sharing Alt-Facts. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol. 14, pp. 55-86.
Kamenica, Emir, and Matthew Gentzkow (2011): Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, vol. 101, pp. 2590-2615.
*Kranton, Rachel, and David McAdams, D. (2022). Social Connectedness and Information Markets.
Liang, Annie (2022): Information and Learning in Economic Theory.
*Papanastasiou, Yiangos (2020): Fake News Propagation and Detection: A Sequential Model. Management Science, 66, 1826--1846.
Pennycook, Gordon, Ziv Epstein, Mohsen Mosleh, Antonio A. Arechar, Dean Eckles, and David G. Rand (2021): Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online. Nature, vol. 592, pp. 590-595.
*Pogorelskyi and Shum (2020): News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes.
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., and Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 359, pp. 1146-1151.