Checking date: 23/07/2021


Course: 2021/2022

Microeconomics III
(16862)
Study: Master in Economic Analysis (68)
EPC


Coordinating teacher: MORENO RUIZ, DIEGO

Department assigned to the subject: Department of Economics

Type: Compulsory
ECTS Credits: 9.0 ECTS

Course:
Semester:




Requirements (Subjects that are assumed to be known)
Microeconomics I and Microeconomics II
Objectives
-Build and analyze models with asymmetric or incomplete information. -Familiarize with the classic applications of these models to real life economic problems. -Grasp the magnitude of the problems in real economies due to asymmetric or incomplete information. -Develop the skills to use the analytical tools of the models of asymmetric or incomplete information: adverse selection, moral hazard, screening, signalling, mechanisms, contracts.
Skills and learning outcomes
Description of contents: programme
Introduction to topics and tools of modern theory of information. 1. Games with Incomplete Information: elements of a game of incomplete and/or asymmetric information, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium. 2. Adverse selection and moral hazard: unobservable characteristics (screening and signalling); unobservable actions: ex ante, interim and ex post efficiency. 3. Introduction to contract theory: menus of contracts, guaranties, bilateral contracts: insurance, credit, labor. 4. Introduction to mechanism and Iiformation design: Bayesian implementation with transferable utility, applications: monopoly, auctions, public goods, bilateral trade. Dominant and ex post implementation with transferable utility.
Learning activities and methodology
In person classes that are streamed online and recorded. Weekly problem sets solved in group work. These are discussed in the practical sessions. Combining textbook material with up-to-date discussion of the current research frontier.
Assessment System
  • % end-of-term-examination 60
  • % of continuous assessment (assigments, laboratory, practicals...) 40
Calendar of Continuous assessment
Basic Bibliography
  • Boergers (with a chapter by Kraehmer and Strauss) . An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Oxford University Press. 2015
  • Bolton and Dewatripont . Contract Theory. MIT Press. 2005
  • Mas Colell, Whinston and Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press. 1996
Additional Bibliography
  • Myerson. Game Theory. Harvard University Press. 1997
Detailed subject contents or complementary information about assessment system of B.T.

The course syllabus and the academic weekly planning may change due academic events or other reasons.


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