OUTLINE OF THE COURSE
Papers marked with a star a classic papers. Papers with an hyphen in front are surveys or recent stuff.
1. Contests. Definition of a contest. Examples.
- Corchón, L. (2007). "The theory of contests: a survey". Review of Economic Design 11, 69, 100.
2. Contest Success Functions. Tullock, Linear, Hirschleifer, All pay auction and others. Microfoundations: Axiomatization. The setting of a single decider. Cooperative foundations.
* Tullock, G. (1980). "Efficient Rent-Seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.) Towards a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A&M University Press: 97-112.
* Hillman, A. and Riley, J. (1987). Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers.Economics and Politics, 1, 3, 17-39.
* Hirshleifer, Jack (1989), Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models. Public Choice 63, 101,112.
* Skaperdas, S. (1996): Contest Success Functions. Economic Theory 2, 283-290.
* Baye, M., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C. (1996). "The all-pay auction with complete information". Economic Theory, 8, 2, 291-305.
- Clark, D. and C. Riis (1998): Contest Success Functions: An Extension. Economic Theory 11, 201-204.
- Corchón, L. (2000): "The Allocative E¤ects of Rent-Seeking." Journal of Public Economic Theory 2, 4, 483-491.
- Corchón, L. and M. Dahm (2010). "Foundations for Contest Success Functions". Economic Theory, 43, 1 81-98.
- Jia, H., Skaperdas, S., Vaidya, S. (2013). "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 3, 211-222.
- Corchón, L. and C. Beviá (2015). "Relative Di¤erence Contest Success Function". Theory and Decision, 78, 377-398, 2015.
3. Properties of Equilibrium and Applications. Symmetric Contests:
Existence, comparative statics and uniqueness of equilibrium. Asymmetric Contests: Basic properties in a special case. Applications: Group contests, rent-seeking and economic performance, sabotage. Biology
* Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
* Perez-Castrillo, D. and T. Verdier (1992): A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games. Public Choice 73, 335-50.
- E. Glaezer, R. La Porta, F. Silanes and A. Shleifer (2004): Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9, 271-303.
- Cornes, R., and R. Hartley (2005). "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies. Economic Theory 26, 4, 923-946.
- Beviá, C. and L. Corchón (2006). "Rational Sabotage with Heterogeneous Agents". Berkeley Electronic J. in Theoretical Econ., Topics. 6, 1.
- Corchón, L. (2007). "The theory of contests: a survey", op cit.
- Chowdhury, S.M., Gürtler, O. (2015). "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey". Public Choice, 164, 1, 135-155.
- Ostreiher, R., Pruett-Jones, S., Heifetz, A. (2012) "Asymmetric contests at the nest". Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 66, 9, 1237-1246.
4. Extensions. Centralized vs decentralized contests. Auctions and contests. Entry. Affirmative action. Networks.
- Azmat, G., and Möller, M. (2009). Competition amongst Contests. RAND Journal of Economics, 40, 743-768.
- Yates, A. (2011). "Winner-pay contests". Public Choice, 147, 1, 93-106.
- Brown, J. (2011) "Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive E¤ects of Competing with Superstars". J. of Political Economy 119, 5, 982-1013
- Franke, J. (2012). The Incentive E¤ects of Leveling the Playing Field: An Empirical Analysis of Amateur Golf Tournaments". Applied Economics 44, 9, 1193-1200.
- Franke, J. (2012). "A¢ rmative Action in Contest Games". European Journal of Political Economy 28, 1,. 105-118.
- Calsamiglia, C., Franke, J., Rey-Biel, P. (2013). "The Incentive E¤ects of Affirmative Action in a Real Effort Tournament". Journal of Public Economics 15-31.
- Franke, J. and T. Öztürk (2015). Conflict Networks (2015). Journal of Public Economics, 126, 104-113
- Corchón, L., Beviá, C. (2015). "Centralized vs Decentralized Contests". Economics Letters, 137(C), 32-35
5. Welfare Properties of Contests. Welfare losses of monopoly and the Coase theorem in rent-seeking societies. The design of optimal contests. Commitment problems.
- Fullerton, R. L., McAfee, P. (1999). "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments". Journal of Political Economy, 107, 3, 573-605.
- Corchón, L. (2007). "The Theory of Contests: a Survey", op. cit.
- Corchón, L. and M. Dahm (2010). "Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit". Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 3, 309-317.
- Franke, J., C. Kanzow, W. Leininger and A. Schwartz (2014). "Lottery versus All Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem". Games & Economic Behavior 83, 116-126.
- Nitzan, S. and Mealem, Y. (2015). "Discrimination in Contests". WP
6. Dynamic contests. Two stage contests. Incentives to pre commit. Who should play First? Grand Contests. Endogenous strength.
* Dixit, A. (1987). "Strategic Behavior in Contests". American Economic Review, 77, 5, 891-898.
- Baik, K. and J. Shogren (1992). "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment" American Economic Review, 82, 1, 359-362.
- Klumpp, T. and M. Polborn (2006). "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect". Journal of Public Economics 90, 1073-1114.
- Konrad, K. (2012). "Dynamic Contests and the Discouragement Effect," Revue déconomie politique, 122, 2, 233-256.
- Corchón, L. and C. Beviá (2013). "Endogenous Strength in Conflicts". International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 3, 195-306.
7. Contests with ties and applications to sports
- Szymanski, S. (2003). "The Assessment: The Economics of Sport". Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19, 4, 467-77.
- Cohen, C. and Sela, A. (2007). "Contests with Ties". The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7, 1.
- Blavatskyy, P. R., (2010). "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization". J. of Mathematical Economics 46, 2, 267-276.
- Yildizparlak, A. (2014). "An Application of Contest Success Functions for Draws on European Soccer". Journal of Sports Economics, July, 12, 2017.
8. Contests with incomplete information
- Malueg, D., and Yates, A., (2004). "Rent seeking with private values", Public Choice, 119, 161-178.
- Wasser, C., (2013). "Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests", Economic Theory, 53, 1, 239-268
9. Experiments
- Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. (2015). "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments". Experimental Economics, 18, 609-669, 2015.
10. War. Rationalist explanations for wars. Are democracies more or less prone to wars than autocracies? How to avoid war.
* Hirshleifer, J. (1991). "The Paradox of Power." Economics & Politics 3, 177-200.
* Skaperdas, S. (1992). "Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights." American Economic Review 82, 4, 720-739.
* Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49: 379-414.
* Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., and J. Morrow (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. The MIT Press.
- Garfinkel, M. and S. Skaperdas (2007). Economics of Conflict: An Overview." T. Sandler and K. Hartley (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, N. Holland.
- Jackson, M., Morelli, M. (2007). Political Bias and War. American Economic Review 97, 4, 1353-1373.
- Jackson, M., Morelli, M. (2009). "The Reasons for Wars. An Updated Survey". C. Coyne (ed.) Handbook on the Political Economy of War, Elgar.
- Beviá, C. and L. Corchón (2010). "Peace Agreements without Commitment". Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 469-487.
- Corchón, L. and A. Yildizparlak (2013). "Give Peace a Chance: The Effect of Asymmetric Information on Peace". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 92, 116-126
- Baliga, S. and T. Sjostrom (2013). "Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models". Korean Economic Review, 29(2), 235-266.
11. Presentation of three faculty members of their latest research.