Microeconomics I and Microeconomics II

-Build and analyze models with asymmetric or incomplete information. -Familiarize with the classic applications of these models to real life economic problems. -Grasp the magnitude of the problems in real economies due to asymmetric or incomplete information. -Develop the skills to use the analytical tools of the models of asymmetric or incomplete information: adverse selection, moral hazard, screening, signaling, mechanisms, contracts.

Introduction to topics and tools of modern theory of information. 1. Games with Incomplete Information: elements of a game of incomplete and/or asymmetric information, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium. 2. Adverse selection and moral hazard: unobservable characteristics (screening and signalling); unobservable actions: ex ante, interim and ex post efficiency. 3. Introduction to contract theory: menus of contracts, guaranties, bilateral contracts: insurance, credit, labor. 4. Introduction to mechanism design: Bayesian implementation with transferable utility, applications: monopoly, auctions, public goods, bilateral trade. Dominant and ex post implementation with transferable utility.

In person classes that are streamed online and recorded. Weekly problem sets solved in group work. These are discussed in the practical sessions. Combining textbook material with up-to-date discussion of the current research frontier.