Microeconomics I and Microeconomics II

-Build and analyze models with asymmetric or incomplete information. -Familiarize with the classic applications of these models to real life economic problems. -Grasp the magnitude of the problems in real economies due to asymmetric or incomplete information. -Develop the skills to use the analytical tools of the models of asymmetric or incomplete information: adverse selection, moral hazard, screening, signaling, mechanisms, contracts.

Introduction to topics and tools of modern theory of information. 1. Games with Incomplete Information: elements of a game of incomplete and/or asymmetric information, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium. 2. Adverse selection and moral hazard: unobservable characteristics (screening and signalling); unobservable actions: ex ante, interim and ex post efficiency. 3. Introduction to contract theory: menus of contracts, guaranties, bilateral contracts: insurance, credit, labor. 4. Introduction to mechanism design: Bayesian implementation with transferable utility, applications: monopoly, auctions, public goods, bilateral trade. Dominant and ex post implementation with transferable utility