Students in Economics or Business learn a great deal about the markets: where supply and demand come from, how to compute equilibrium prices, and what happens if some parameter changes. Other problems have at least a straightforward analysis in the curriculum. For example, the way we determine price matters, and there are markets where prices have no role to play.
Market design is the discipline that has arisen from the considerations of these problems. If the role of a market is to decide who gets what, market design is the area of economics that is interested in how who gets what is decided.
The standard way to determine who gets what is using prices, but when the number of objects to be allocated is small and, perhaps not homogeneous, Auctions are the tools we use to allocate objects when prices are used. We will study them in this course.
In addition, monetary exchanges are often out of the question. Think about school placement, course allocation, university admissions, and organ donation. In this case, the market design also has a well-defined set of tools called matching models.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Market and market design.
Chapter 2. Simple Auctions.
Chapter 3. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction.
Chapter 4. Analysis of eBay and keyword auctions.
Chapter 5. Spectrum Auctions.
Chapter 6. The basic matching models.
Chapter 7. Design of labor markets: National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
Chapter 8. Assignment problems.
Chapter 9. School choice: basic theory and recent developments.
Chapter 10. Course Allocation.
Chapter 11. Kidney exchange.
Chapter 12. Matching with complex preferences.